

# Electronic Supplemental Material for “Corporate Apology for Environmental Damage”

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## 1 Description

This appendix reports robustness checks and additional regression results for Gilbert, James, and Shogren (2018). Tables 1 through 3 in this appendix report robustness checks for treatment effects on the self-reported Likert scale likelihood of a “personal response”. Table 1 reports results for the likelihood of boycotting the firm’s products, Table 2 for the likelihood of opposing local development by the firm, and Table 3 for the likelihood of signing a petition urging federal prosecution. These results correspond to the main results in Table 2 of the full paper. For comparison purposes, the first column in each of Tables 1 through 3 in this appendix repeat the exact results for each of the three personal responses that were reported in Table 2 of the full paper. This is an ordered logit in which the dependent variable was the Likert scale self-reported likelihood of a personal response, and the right hand side variables were the treatment dummies and control variables. Controls consisted of dummy variables for whether the subject had ever visited an ocean or a national park and whether the subject had children, the subject’s environmentalism score, a quadratic in their age, and their income category. The second columns in Tables 1 through 3 in this appendix report ordered logit

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results without control variables. The third and fourth columns report results of an ordered probit with and without control variables. The fifth and sixth columns report results of an OLS regression, again with and without control variables. The signs, magnitudes, and patterns of statistical significance are generally consistent across all specifications in the three tables, confirming the robustness of the results reported in the full paper to alternative specifications.

Table 4 in this appendix reports heterogeneous treatment effects on the self-reported Likert scale likelihood of a personal response, by whether or not the subject had ever visited a national park. These results can be compared to Tables 3 through 5 in the full paper, which divide the sample by high and low self-reported environmentalism scores, and by whether or not the subject had ever visited an ocean. Our intention was to investigate heterogeneous treatment effects by subjects with high and low valuation of the environment. Park visitation in our sample (households in the Midwest) was much more common than ocean visitation or high environmental sentiment, and is likely a much weaker indication of valuation of marine ecosystems. This is reflected in the results in Table 4 of this appendix, which are only loosely consistent with the heterogeneous effects reported in the full paper.

Table 5 in this appendix reports results from alternative specifications for treatment effects on the preferred fine size. Specifically we report results from a set of discrete choice conditional logit regressions in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 for the subjects preferred fine and equal to zero for each other fine available. These results should be compared to Table 7 in the full paper, which uses the magnitude of the preferred fine as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables in the conditional logit regressions reported here include the size of the preferred fine (or its natural log), and the preferred fine interacted with treatment dummies and each of the control variables. Interactions are used for two reasons. First, the conditional logit estimator “conditions out” individual-specific effects, which are perfectly colinear with any variables that are fixed at the subject level (i.e., don’t vary across the choice options, which were the various fine sizes); the interactions with fine size provide variation across choice option and individual. Second, the interactions describe whether a large fine was more or less preferred when the interacted covariate increases by one unit. For

example, the positive coefficients on the fine size alone indicate that larger fines are generally more preferred. The positive coefficients on the interaction between fine size and the “Bad” treatment (bad reputational information, no apology signal) indicate that the preference for larger fines is stronger for subjects in this treatment. The qualitative interpretation of these coefficients is therefore analogous to the coefficients in Table 7 of the full paper. There is a similar pattern of coefficient signs, relative magnitudes, and statistical significance in Table 5 of this appendix as there is in Table 7 of the main paper, indicating the robustness of the results. However, fewer coefficients in Table 5 of the appendix are statistically significant. The conditional logit model may not fit the data as well considering that it removes the natural ranking of fine size from the dependent variable.

## **2 Tables and Figures**

Table 1: Treatment effects on likelihood of boycotting: robustness checks

	Ordered Logit		Ordered Probit		OLS	
Sorry	0.21 (0.262)	0.17 (0.254)	0.11 (0.152)	0.070 (0.150)	0.21 (0.254)	0.16 (0.265)
Blame	-0.16 (0.276)	-0.16 (0.265)	-0.080 (0.157)	-0.10 (0.154)	-0.12 (0.263)	-0.17 (0.272)
Good	-0.49* (0.286)	-0.57** (0.268)	-0.28* (0.162)	-0.33** (0.157)	-0.49* (0.272)	-0.60** (0.278)
Good, Sorry	-0.89*** (0.310)	-0.98*** (0.299)	-0.50*** (0.173)	-0.55*** (0.169)	-0.86*** (0.292)	-0.99*** (0.298)
Good, Blame	-0.49* (0.274)	-0.56** (0.264)	-0.28* (0.161)	-0.34** (0.154)	-0.47* (0.276)	-0.59** (0.277)
Bad	0.68** (0.281)	0.52* (0.274)	0.37** (0.168)	0.28* (0.163)	0.60** (0.272)	0.51* (0.278)
Bad, Sorry	0.54** (0.275)	0.49* (0.269)	0.25 (0.163)	0.20 (0.164)	0.44* (0.265)	0.39 (0.280)
Bad, Blame	0.67** (0.296)	0.52* (0.289)	0.40** (0.171)	0.30* (0.167)	0.63** (0.276)	0.50* (0.282)
Visit ocean	0.20 (0.190)		0.12 (0.107)		0.18 (0.176)	
Visit park	-0.17 (0.155)		-0.098 (0.0905)		-0.16 (0.151)	
Enviro	-0.66*** (0.0937)		-0.38*** (0.0536)		-0.61*** (0.0837)	
Age	0.061** (0.0295)		0.044** (0.0179)		0.068** (0.0301)	
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.70** (0.299)		-0.49*** (0.181)		-0.76** (0.304)	
Kids	0.16 (0.154)		0.12 (0.0902)		0.18 (0.148)	
Income	-0.054 (0.0486)		-0.032 (0.0291)		-0.056 (0.0486)	
Intercept					4.69*** (0.778)	4.43*** (0.196)
<i>N</i>	741	750	741	750	741	750
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> /Pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.048	0.020	0.046	0.018	0.16	0.07

**Note.** Respondents stated the likelihood that they would engage in each action on a seven point Likert scale. The first column reports the first column from Table 2 of the paper, estimated by ordered logit. The remaining columns demonstrate robustness with and without controls, estimated by ordered probit and ordinary least squares. Treatment dummies are relative to the baseline (no apology, no information) treatment. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses below regression coefficients, with statistical significance indicated by: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The Age<sup>2</sup> variable was divided by 1,000 to rescale its coefficient.

Table 2: Treatment effects on likelihood of opposing local development: robustness checks

	Ordered Logit		Ordered Probit		OLS	
Sorry	0.34 (0.252)	0.35 (0.249)	0.18 (0.149)	0.16 (0.149)	0.30 (0.246)	0.29 (0.260)
Blame	0.017 (0.273)	0.046 (0.261)	0.013 (0.157)	-0.00054 (0.153)	0.012 (0.260)	-0.011 (0.267)
Good	-0.52* (0.275)	-0.61** (0.257)	-0.32** (0.158)	-0.37** (0.152)	-0.58** (0.267)	-0.69** (0.271)
Good, Sorry	-0.68** (0.310)	-0.75** (0.299)	-0.40** (0.173)	-0.45*** (0.168)	-0.71** (0.291)	-0.82*** (0.297)
Good, Blame	-0.40 (0.262)	-0.44* (0.252)	-0.21 (0.154)	-0.25* (0.148)	-0.39 (0.265)	-0.47* (0.267)
Bad	0.75*** (0.280)	0.63** (0.273)	0.42** (0.171)	0.35** (0.164)	0.67** (0.271)	0.58** (0.272)
Bad, Sorry	0.57** (0.275)	0.55** (0.264)	0.30* (0.160)	0.26 (0.158)	0.49* (0.258)	0.45* (0.268)
Bad, Blame	0.67** (0.279)	0.55** (0.275)	0.40** (0.165)	0.30* (0.161)	0.64** (0.265)	0.51* (0.270)
Visit ocean	0.26 (0.185)		0.13 (0.107)		0.21 (0.172)	
Visit park	-0.14 (0.154)		-0.077 (0.0893)		-0.13 (0.149)	
Enviro	-0.66*** (0.0956)		-0.38*** (0.0538)		-0.60*** (0.0845)	
Age	0.087*** (0.0302)		0.054*** (0.0181)		0.086*** (0.0300)	
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.92*** (0.312)		-0.57*** (0.185)		-0.92*** (0.308)	
Kids	0.20 (0.153)		0.13 (0.0897)		0.22 (0.146)	
Income	-0.073 (0.0524)		-0.045 (0.0305)		-0.085* (0.0502)	
Intercept					4.29*** (0.755)	4.50*** (0.185)
<i>N</i>	741	750	741	750	741	750
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> / <i>P</i> seudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.048	0.019	0.047	0.018	0.16	0.07

**Note.** Respondents stated the likelihood that they would engage in each action on a seven point Likert scale. The first column reports the second column from Table 2 of the paper, estimated by ordered logit. The remaining columns demonstrate robustness with and without controls, estimated by ordered probit and ordinary least squares. Treatment dummies are relative to the baseline (no apology, no information) treatment. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses below regression coefficients, with statistical significance indicated by: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The Age<sup>2</sup> variable was divided by 1,000 to rescale its coefficient.

Table 3: Treatment effects on likelihood of signing a petition: robustness checks

	Ordered Logit		Ordered Probit		OLS	
Sorry	0.38 (0.281)	0.35 (0.273)	0.20 (0.165)	0.17 (0.162)	0.39 (0.290)	0.35 (0.302)
Blame	-0.046 (0.274)	-0.022 (0.261)	-0.030 (0.157)	-0.050 (0.154)	0.014 (0.288)	-0.036 (0.298)
Good	-0.30 (0.294)	-0.37 (0.279)	-0.19 (0.169)	-0.24 (0.163)	-0.34 (0.307)	-0.44 (0.313)
Good, Sorry	-0.73** (0.301)	-0.75*** (0.291)	-0.41** (0.172)	-0.44*** (0.168)	-0.77** (0.316)	-0.85*** (0.326)
Good, Blame	-0.43 (0.272)	-0.49* (0.258)	-0.24 (0.158)	-0.30* (0.152)	-0.45 (0.298)	-0.58* (0.303)
Bad	1.06*** (0.286)	0.90*** (0.272)	0.60*** (0.174)	0.51*** (0.166)	1.08*** (0.290)	0.99*** (0.292)
Bad, Sorry	0.52* (0.283)	0.48* (0.283)	0.26 (0.166)	0.22 (0.167)	0.50* (0.289)	0.45 (0.308)
Bad, Blame	0.75*** (0.281)	0.63** (0.278)	0.46*** (0.167)	0.35** (0.167)	0.85*** (0.286)	0.69** (0.301)
Visit ocean	0.32* (0.183)		0.17 (0.107)		0.29 (0.184)	
Visit park	-0.25 (0.158)		-0.14 (0.0937)		-0.23 (0.170)	
Enviro	-0.69*** (0.0958)		-0.41*** (0.0548)		-0.68*** (0.0912)	
Age	0.052* (0.0314)		0.033* (0.0189)		0.052 (0.0336)	
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.61* (0.324)		-0.39** (0.192)		-0.62* (0.345)	
Kids	0.038 (0.154)		0.039 (0.0911)		0.042 (0.162)	
Income	-0.054 (0.0503)		-0.031 (0.0296)		-0.049 (0.0530)	
Intercept					5.38*** (0.861)	4.45*** (0.217)
<i>N</i>	741	750	741	750	741	750
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> /Pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.051	0.021	0.050	0.019	0.17	0.08

**Note.** Respondents stated the likelihood that they would engage in each action on a seven point Likert scale. The first column reports the third column from Table 2 of the paper, estimated by ordered logit. The remaining columns demonstrate robustness with and without controls, estimated by ordered probit and ordinary least squares. Treatment dummies are relative to the baseline (no apology, no information) treatment. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses below regression coefficients, with statistical significance indicated by: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The Age<sup>2</sup> variable was divided by 1,000 to rescale its coefficient.

Table 4: Treatment effects on likelihood of a personal response, by national park visitation

	Boycott		Oppose		Petition	
	Visited Park	Never Visited Park	Visited Park	Never Visited Park	Visited Park	Never Visited Park
Sorry	-0.24 (0.307)	1.84*** (0.514)	0.12 (0.290)	1.16** (0.533)	0.070 (0.320)	1.38** (0.643)
Blame	-0.33 (0.358)	0.44 (0.471)	-0.18 (0.338)	0.71 (0.515)	-0.41 (0.345)	1.00** (0.506)
Good	-0.51 (0.350)	-0.84 (0.592)	-0.50 (0.328)	-0.98 (0.607)	-0.58 (0.357)	0.13 (0.583)
Good, Sorry	-1.00*** (0.357)	-1.12* (0.625)	-0.73** (0.355)	-1.11* (0.637)	-0.91*** (0.344)	-0.68 (0.607)
Good, Blame	-0.68** (0.334)	0.078 (0.513)	-0.52* (0.307)	-0.018 (0.511)	-0.62* (0.321)	-0.0057 (0.557)
Bad	0.54 (0.343)	0.67 (0.552)	0.59* (0.345)	0.88* (0.471)	0.70** (0.339)	1.82*** (0.626)
Bad, Sorry	0.35 (0.317)	0.79 (0.718)	0.37 (0.305)	1.36** (0.646)	0.25 (0.323)	1.20* (0.619)
Bad, Blame	0.71** (0.338)	0.017 (0.766)	0.81*** (0.307)	-0.38 (0.650)	0.74** (0.325)	0.42 (0.665)
Visit ocean	0.22 (0.197)	-0.51 (0.667)	0.23 (0.194)	0.033 (0.552)	0.26 (0.195)	0.49 (0.564)
Enviro	-0.81*** (0.113)	-0.25 (0.179)	-0.81*** (0.114)	-0.17 (0.183)	-0.89*** (0.116)	-0.19 (0.190)
Age	0.10*** (0.0366)	-0.087 (0.0606)	0.12*** (0.0360)	-0.042 (0.0602)	0.10*** (0.0373)	-0.100 (0.0618)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-1.1*** (0.370)	0.76 (0.605)	-1.3*** (0.367)	0.47 (0.631)	-1.1*** (0.385)	0.83 (0.630)
Kids	0.25 (0.180)	0.0010 (0.325)	0.24 (0.178)	0.24 (0.330)	0.19 (0.178)	-0.25 (0.329)
Income	-0.060 (0.0538)	-0.037 (0.124)	-0.079 (0.0587)	-0.064 (0.120)	-0.067 (0.0565)	-0.034 (0.115)
<i>N</i>	565	176	565	176	565	176
Pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.060	0.060	0.059	0.057	0.066	0.050

**Note.** Respondents stated the likelihood that they would engage in each action on a seven point Likert scale. This table reports effects estimated by ordered logit with the sample divided by those who had or had not ever visited a national park. Treatment dummies are relative to the baseline (no apology, no information) treatment. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses below regression coefficients, with statistical significance indicated by: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The Age<sup>2</sup> variable was divided by 1,000 to rescale its coefficient.

Table 5: Treatment effects on likelihood of accepting a given fine size: conditional logit

	Fine		Ln(Fine)	
Fine or Ln(Fine)	0.017 (0.0169)	0.14** (0.0672)	0.20 (0.146)	1.42** (0.620)
Interactions with Fine or Ln(Fine):				
Sorry	0.0074 (0.0232)	0.012 (0.0234)	0.084 (0.201)	0.13 (0.200)
Blame	-0.013 (0.0237)	-0.0062 (0.0240)	-0.11 (0.198)	-0.051 (0.201)
Good	-0.0056 (0.0242)	-0.0029 (0.0248)	-0.073 (0.207)	-0.044 (0.210)
Good, Sorry	-0.015 (0.0252)	-0.0063 (0.0264)	-0.15 (0.210)	-0.076 (0.219)
Good, Blame	-0.046* (0.0241)	-0.039 (0.0250)	-0.29 (0.193)	-0.23 (0.200)
Bad	0.043* (0.0237)	0.051** (0.0248)	0.48** (0.215)	0.55** (0.222)
Bad, Sorry	0.029 (0.0222)	0.033 (0.0228)	0.34* (0.202)	0.39* (0.202)
Bad, Blame	0.026 (0.0237)	0.040 (0.0241)	0.28 (0.213)	0.40* (0.210)
Visit ocean		0.024* (0.0138)		0.25** (0.125)
Visit park		-0.021 (0.0139)		-0.22* (0.121)
Enviro		-0.036*** (0.00786)		-0.31*** (0.0663)
Age		0.0011 (0.00270)		0.0035 (0.0231)
Age <sup>2</sup>		-0.028 (0.0279)		-0.17 (0.235)
Kids		-0.014 (0.0136)		-0.11 (0.115)
Income		-0.00095 (0.00379)		-0.0091 (0.0321)
<i>N</i>	4446	4446	4446	4446
Pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.026	0.017	0.032

**Note.** This table demonstrates the robustness of the results in Table 7 of the paper to alternative assumptions about choosing a preferred fine. Preferences for environmental fines may not be monotonic in the population; this table reports results from an unordered discrete choice conditional logit model for fine size. The left hand side variable is equal to one for subject *i*'s preferred fine and zero for every other fine option. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses below regression coefficients, with statistical significance indicated by: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The Age<sup>2</sup> variable was divided by 1,000 to rescale its coefficient.



### 3 Survey Instrument

### Consent

Hi! We are doing some public opinion research using a five-minute survey. Your answers may be used to improve public policy. If you don't like the survey that's totally fine - you can quit at any time and your answers will not be recorded. (If you don't finish, however, you will not receive compensation for taking the survey.)

We will describe a scenario and ask a few questions about your preferences. Some of the scenarios may be hypothetical; we'll let you know which part, if any, is hypothetical after the survey is over. We are interested in *your personal* preferences even if the scenario occurred far from your home.

If you have read the research description and agree to participate please click below.

### Compensation Eligibility

Which option below best describes you?

- I do not value the conservation of marine species and habitats at all
- I have at least some value for the conservation of marine species and habitats in U.S. waters

### Scenario Part A

Last year a tanker delivering oil from U.S. reservoirs in Alaska to the Continental U.S. ran aground off the coast of Northern California near a wildlife and marine reserve.

The area had been classified as one of 34 coastal habitats with "Special Biological Significance" and was home to one of the few remaining colonies of two endangered species: a butterfly and a flower species. The reserve includes a three-mile stretch of beach, a marsh, and cypress and eucalyptus forests on the Pacific Ocean. The property is managed by government agencies on behalf of the U.S. public as a park and nature preserve.

The tanker spilled enough oil to heavily damage the marine life and tidepool habitat in and around the reserve. Hundreds of hours of clean-up work have been performed in the year since the oil spill but the reserve has not recovered.

Despite removing all the oil, scientists do not expect the habitat to support its former abundance of sea lions, shore bird colonies, and intertidal sea life. The fate of the endangered species colonies in the area is not known, although the spill did not affect colonies at other locations.



Species that were abundant in the reserve:

Sea anemone



Sea urchin



Cormorants



California sea lions



Endangered species with colonies in the reserve:

San Bruno elfin butterfly



Hickmans potentilla



Had you heard of either of these endangered species before?

- Yes  
 No

### California

Have you ever been to California?

- Yes  
 No

How many times have you been there?

- Once
- Twice
- Three to five times
- More than five times

What year were you there last?

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Did you visit the central California coast?

- Yes
- No

### Scenario Part B

Now we're going to discuss the company involved in the spill.

The tanker owner is a Texas-based energy firm who employs 15,000 people around the U.S.

In these cases, government agencies often decide how much the responsible party will pay towards clean-up, fines, and compensation for the American people. We are using this survey to try to improve these decisions.

Now we're going to discuss the company involved in the spill.

The tanker owner is a Texas-based energy firm who employs 15,000 people around the U.S.

Shortly after the spill the CEO told reporters, "On behalf of our management team, I would like to convey our deep remorse over the damage this spill has caused to our environment and extend our sincerest apology. We are disappointed by this lapse in our safety protocol and we are adjusting our procedures to minimize the chances of, and impacts from, future spills. We would like to pledge whatever resources we can to assist in the cleanup and plan to open a fund to cover the damages."

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Now we're going to discuss the company involved in the spill.

The tanker owner is a Texas-based energy firm who employs 15,000 people around the U.S. In the last 10 years, this company has had no other sizeable oil spills (one of the lowest rates in the industry), and they have won awards from multiple local communities for good stewardship. After the recent spill, the firm sent a large force of clean-up workers and worked hand-in-hand with local volunteers and nonprofit groups.

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The tanker owner is a Texas-based energy firm who employs 15,000 people around the U.S. In the last 10 years, this company has had more than 20 spills of at least 50 barrels of oil (one of the highest rates in the industry), and they have appeared on multiple watchdog groups' "worst of the worst" lists for their handling of environmental accidents. After the recent spill, the number of clean-up workers sent by the firm was not sufficient to remove the oil and clean up was handled primarily by local volunteers and nonprofit groups.

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### Size of Fine

Suppose the oil company has paid the mandated clean-up costs and compensation for those directly affected. In addition to these payments, how big of a fine do you think the oil company should have to pay?

- Less than \$5 million
- \$5 million
- \$10 million
- More than \$10 million

You said the oil company should have to pay a fine larger than \$10 million. Which do you prefer?

- Between \$10 million and \$15 million
- More than \$15 million

You said the oil company should pay a fine of less than \$5 million. Which do you prefer?

- Between \$2 million and \$5 million
- Less than \$2 million
- No fine in excess of the compensation for damages and clean-up costs already paid

### Compensation Prep

We are going to ask you to make a series of choices. For each choice, please vote for the one you prefer. Consider each choice independently, as if it were the only choice you had to make.

Although these choices are hypothetical, please vote as if whichever option the majority chooses will be provided. In doing so, please keep in mind your budget for expenses like food, housing, entertainment, and recreation.

### Compensation

Suppose the oil company has paid all of its fines in addition to the mandated clean-up costs and compensation for those directly affected.

Now government agencies must negotiate a settlement for those *indirectly* affected, such as people who valued the habitat and species but did not depend on them for their livelihood.

Earlier you said you have at least some value for the conservation of marine life in U.S. waters. Imagine that this makes you eligible for compensation.

Consider the following settlement: the oil company will pay each eligible person, including you, \$100 in compensation. A majority of eligible parties must vote to accept this deal.

Based on what you know of the marine reserve and how much *you personally* value it, and taking into account your normal budget for expenses like food, housing, clothes, and recreation, would you vote to accept or reject this offer?

- Accept  
 Reject

You voted to accept the settlement. Would you have voted to accept or reject the offer if it were \$50 per person?

- Accept  
 Reject

You voted to reject the settlement. Which of these most accurately states your reasoning?

- \$100 is not enough for me  
 \$100 is enough for me, but I think we could get more  
 \$100 is more than I should be compensated

You said \$100 per person was too high. Would you have voted to accept the offer if it were \$50 per person?

- Yes  
 No, that's too small  
 No, that's still too large. I don't require much compensation for this.

You said \$100 per person was too low. Would you have voted to accept the offer if it were \$200 per person?

- Yes  
 No, that's still too small  
 No, that's too large. I don't need that much compensation for this.

### Other Retribution

Please state how likely you would be to do each of the following:

Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Undecided	Somewhat Likely	Likely	Very Likely
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

### Follow Up

Now we would like to ask a few questions about what you had in mind while making these choices.

When you were making your choices, did the apology from the company's CEO influence your decisions?

- Yes  
 No

If so, did you want a smaller fine or a larger fine as a result of the apology?

- smaller  
 larger  
 no difference  
 not sure

Did the CEO's apology make you more likely to accept a smaller settlement or require a larger one?

- smaller  
 larger  
 no difference  
 not sure

When you were making your choices, did this company's track record with oil spills influence your decisions?

- Yes  
 No

If so, did the company's track record make you support a smaller fine or a larger fine?

- smaller  
 larger  
 no difference  
 not sure

**Did the company's track record make you more likely to accept a smaller settlement or a larger one?**

- smaller
- larger
- no difference
- not sure

**Do you think the energy company intends to improve its safety practices?**

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Not sure

**Does anyone in your household visit the ocean frequently?**

- Yes
- No

**Has anyone in your household ever visited a National Park?**

- Yes
- No

**Do you think of yourself as an environmentalist?**

- Yes, very strongly
- Yes, somewhat
- No, not really
- No, definitely not
- Not sure

**Do you watch television shows about ocean life?**

- Not At All
- Occasionally
- Frequently

**In what year were you born?**



**What is the last level of formal education you completed?**

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- Middle school
- Some high school
- High school diploma or equivalency
- Some college
- Associates degree, trade school, or certificate program
- Bachelors degree
- Some graduate school
- Graduate or professional degree

**How many people under the age of 18 live with you?**

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**What was your total household income before taxes last year?**

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- Less than \$25,000
- \$25,000 to \$50,000
- \$50,000 to \$75,000
- \$75,000 to \$100,000
- \$100,000 to \$125,000
- \$125,000 to \$150,000
- \$150,000 to \$250,000
- More than \$250,000